CVE-2026-93757
7.5HighPublished 29 Oct 2026 · NVD status: Deferred · AI triage by gemini-3.1-flash-lite
High
0CVSS v3.110
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- Low
- User action
- None
- Impact
- Full C/I/A compromise
- Weakness
- CWE-287
What an attacker gets
Authenticated attackers can hijack WordPress administrator accounts by matching emails via SSO. This requires an attacker to control a WildApricot account with the same email as a target WordPress admin.
Root cause
The plugin binds SSO identities to local WordPress accounts based solely on email addresses without verifying ownership.
Affected versions
Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress through 1.0.18
CVSS v3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fix & remediation
Disable the Wild Apricot Login plugin immediately until a patched version is released by the vendor.
$ wp plugin deactivate wild-apricot-loginAI-suggested. Run it in staging first and check it against the vendor advisory. Why?
NVD description
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by('email', ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user — both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
References
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Authorization/WaLogin/Controller.php#L347
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/Module.php#L112
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/Module.php#L159
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/WaApi/Client.php#L22
- https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Synchronization/UserSynchronizer.php#L36
- https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9adbe55e-f1a1-4fa8-b28d-539d90d81c68?source=cve