CVE-2026-85659

8.8High

Published 16 Oct 2026 · NVD status: Deferred · AI triage by gemini-3.8-flash

8.8High

Attack vector: Network
Complexity: Low
Privileges needed: Low
User interaction: None
Impact: Full C/I/A compromise
Weakness: CWE-269

Impact

Authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access can completely take over WordPress Administrator accounts. They need an active account with a linked ONTRAPORT contact and a valid Customer Center nonce.

Root cause

The update_cc_details handler updates the remote ONTRAPORT username before running local collision checks without rolling back on collision, allowing attackers to overwrite admin credentials during subsequent ONTRAPORT authentication sync.

Affected systems

PilotPress plugin for WordPress versions up to, and including, 2.0.43

CVSS v3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Fix & remediation

Upgrade PilotPress to a version newer than 2.0.43 (check the vendor repository for the latest release containing changeset 3737004). If patching cannot be done immediately, deactivate the PilotPress plugin.

shell

$ wp plugin update pilotpress

AI-suggested. Run it in staging first and check it against the vendor advisory. Why?

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NVD description

The PilotPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.43. The vulnerability exists because the `update_cc_details()` AJAX handler forwards an attacker-supplied `username` parameter to ONTRAPORT via `api_call('update_cc_details', ...)` before performing the local `username_exists()` collision check, and aborts without rolling back the remote rename when a collision is detected — leaving the remote ONTRAPORT contact renamed to an existing WordPress Administrator's login. On a subsequent login attempt, `user_login()` (hooked to `wp_authenticate`) authenticates against ONTRAPORT using the renamed login and the attacker's own password, resolves the local WordPress user row via `get_user_by('login', $username)` — which now selects the real Administrator's row — and calls `wp_set_password()` against that Administrator's user ID; because the `user_level != 10` guard only suppresses PilotPress's own cookie issuance rather than returning a `WP_Error` to core, WordPress proceeds to validate the newly-synchronized password and issues a full Administrator authentication cookie to the attacker. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above — specifically any PilotPress member holding a valid ONTRAPORT contact and the Customer Center nonce — to fully take over an Administrator account.

References

Source: nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85659