CVE-2026-77329
8.8HighPublished 20 Nov 2026 · NVD status: Received
High
0CVSS v4.010
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User action
- Passive
- Impact
- High impact on confidentiality, integrity
- Weakness
- CWE-346, CWE-350
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CVSS v4.0 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
NVD description
Tapo provides Rust and Python APIs and an MCP server for TP-Link Tapo smart devices. From 0.3.1 until 0.5.0, the Streamable HTTP implementation in tapo-mcp/src/server.rs calls disable_allowed_hosts() without replacement Host or Origin validation, while TAPO_MCP_API_KEY remains optional for a listener that can bind to all interfaces. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to send same-origin browser requests to the victim's local or LAN Tapo MCP listener when it runs without an API key. The attacker can invoke exposed tools including control_device for smart-device actuation and take_snapshot for configured cameras. Deployments with TAPO_MCP_API_KEY set are not affected by the unauthenticated path, and exploitation requires a running listener configured with real Tapo credentials and devices, plus victim interaction with the malicious site. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0.
References
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/commit/cb9c5d4372bddfa11f19dc653a27c9aa4fa92833
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/releases/tag/tapo-mcp-v0.5.0
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/security/advisories/GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/security/advisories/GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6