CVE-2026-19741
7.5HighPublished 23 Oct 2026 · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis · AI triage by gemini-3.8-flash
High
0CVSS v3.110
- Attack vector
- Adjacent network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User action
- None
- Impact
- Full C/I/A compromise
- Weakness
- CWE-1392
What an attacker gets
Unauthenticated attackers within 802.15.4 radio range can take full control of an uncommissioned device's Thread network traffic by hijacking its commissioning handshake. They only need proximity to a device that is factory-fresh, factory-reset, or running with cleared settings.
Root cause
Zephyr defaulted the OpenThread joiner pre-shared key (CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD) to the well-known public sample credential 'J01NME' without requiring an override when autostart was enabled.
Affected versions
Versions not listed — check the vendor advisory.
CVSS v3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fix & remediation
Apply commit acb3e514d7fab2bc9672acaba8019d2dc91b187c or your vendor's patched Zephyr release. If unable to patch immediately, set a unique CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD in your Kconfig, or disable CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART and handle commissioning via application code using per-device factory credentials.
AI-suggested. Run it in staging first and check it against the vendor advisory. Why?
NVD description
Zephyr's OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with default "J01NME" in modules/openthread/Kconfig.thread (previously subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig, then subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig.thread). J01NME is the example Joining Device Credential used throughout the public OpenThread and Thread commissioning documentation, including Zephyr's own samples/net/sockets/echo_client/README.rst, so it is not a secret. A firmware image built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y that never overrode the PSKd therefore shipped with a publicly known joining credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning. The PSKd is the only value that authenticates Thread commissioning: joiner and commissioner run a DTLS-PSK handshake keyed on it, after which the commissioner supplies the full operational dataset. In ot_configure_instance() (modules/openthread/openthread.c), a device with no stored dataset calls otJoinerStart() with the configured PSKd, and ot_joiner_start_handler() calls otThreadSetEnabled() on success. An unauthenticated attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device (factory-fresh, after a factory reset, or after a settings erase) can run any stock Thread commissioner registered with J01NME, complete the handshake, and hand the device an attacker-controlled operational dataset. The device then joins and enables Thread on the attacker's mesh. The attacker becomes its router, seeing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all of the device's IPv6 traffic and impersonating the peers the application expects, while the device is cut off from the network it was meant to join and stays mis-provisioned until it is reset. Only application-layer security with independently provisioned credentials survives. Exposure is limited to builds that enable joiner autostart and leave the PSKd unset; the option is not enabled by default and no in-tree sample uses the vulnerable combination. The fix removes the default from CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD and adds a BUILD_ASSERT() in modules/openthread/openthread.c, active only under CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART, that fails the build unless a 6-to-32-character PSKd is configured. Products should provision a per-device PSKd from factory data and call otJoinerStart() from the application rather than relying on a credential compiled identically into every unit.