CVE-2026-112377

7.4High

Published 19 Oct 2026 · NVD status: Deferred · AI triage by gemini-3.8-flash

7.4High

Attack vector: Network
Complexity: High
Privileges needed: None
User interaction: None
Impact: High impact on confidentiality, integrity
Weakness: CWE-346

Impact

Attackers with an extracted TLS private key can impersonate attested workloads and intercept sensitive traffic. They do this over the network by relaying genuine attestation evidence alongside forwarded nonces.

Root cause

The protocol fails to cryptographically bind early attestation evidence directly to the active TLS handshake connection.

Affected systems

CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82

CVSS v3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Fix & remediation

Merge PR #58 or pull the latest changes past commit 731ca82 from the attested-tls-poc repository. As an interim workaround, prevent private key exfiltration and avoid using early attestation handshakes across untrusted network boundaries.

shell

$ git pull origin main

AI-suggested. Run it in staging first and check it against the vendor advisory. Why?

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NVD description

CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester and replay its Evidence to impersonate the attested workload and intercept data.

References

Source: nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112377