CVE-2026-110724
7.5HighPublished 15 Oct 2026 · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis · AI triage by gemini-3.8-flash
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Impact
- High impact on integrity
- Weakness
- CWE-269, CWE-639, CWE-863
Impact
Remote, unauthenticated attackers can completely bypass rate limiting across all gateway routes using the default configuration. They only need network access to send HTTP requests with spoofed X-Forwarded-For headers.
Root cause
The default ClientIpKeyResolver extracts the client IP directly from the unvalidated leftmost X-Forwarded-For header value without verifying upstream proxies.
Affected systems
api-gateway versions up to and including 1.7.3
CVSS v3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Fix & remediation
Upgrade api-gateway to a version newer than 1.7.3, or replace the default ClientIpKeyResolver with a custom resolver that validates upstream proxy headers or uses the immediate peer address.
AI-suggested. Run it in staging first and check it against the vendor advisory. Why?
NVD description
In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.