CVE-2026-110723
7.5HighPublished 15 Oct 2026 · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis · AI triage by gemini-3.8-flash
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Impact
- High impact on availability
- Weakness
- CWE-290, CWE-644
Impact
Remote, unauthenticated attackers can completely bypass request rate limiting by spoofing the X-Forwarded-For header, enabling denial-of-service against downstream services. They only need direct network access to the API gateway.
Root cause
The default ClientIpKeyResolver trusts the leftmost value in the X-Forwarded-For header without validating it against a trusted proxy list.
Affected systems
api-gateway versions up to and including 1.7.3
CVSS v3.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Fix & remediation
Upgrade to a version past 1.7.3 once available. As an immediate workaround, configure the gateway or edge proxy to strip or overwrite the client-provided X-Forwarded-For header, or implement a custom KeyResolver that uses the actual remote socket address.
AI-suggested. Run it in staging first and check it against the vendor advisory. Why?
NVD description
In `api-gateway` versions till `1.7.3`, The default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.