CVE-2026-105280
6.9MediumPublished 12 Oct 2026 · NVD status: Deferred · AI triage by gemini-3.8-flash
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- Active
- Impact
- High impact on integrity
- Weakness
- CWE-354
Impact
A malicious or compromised package mirror can inject arbitrary tarballs or code into build pipelines. They need control over your configured Hex mirror and a workflow that pipes `mix hex.package fetch --output -` directly to an extractor.
Root cause
The stdout output branch of `mix hex.package fetch` streams raw downloaded bytes without running the registry checksum checks that normal file downloads perform.
Affected systems
Hex 0.20.2 before 2.5.2
CVSS v4.0 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Fix & remediation
Upgrade Hex to version 2.5.2 or later. If upgrading immediately is not possible, do not pipe standard output using `--output -`; download to a named file using `--output FILE` so Hex validates the checksum.
$ mix local.hex --forceAI-suggested. Run it in staging first and check it against the vendor advisory. Why?
NVD description
Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability in hexpm hex allows a package mirror to substitute the tarball that mix hex.package fetch PACKAGE VERSION --output - writes to standard output. Hex compares a fetched tarball's inner and outer checksums with the repository's signed registry before writing it to a file or unpacking it. The standard output branch of mix hex.package fetch writes the bytes returned by Hex.SCM.fetch/3 without that comparison, and Hex.SCM.fetch/3 doesn't verify freshly downloaded tarballs itself. When a mirror configured with HEX_MIRROR_URL or mirror_url serves altered bytes, the command prints them and exits successfully, while the same fetch with --output FILE fails with a checksum mismatch. Hex also prints diagnostics to standard output while the command runs: the body of a failed HTTP response from the update check or a registry fetch, and API warnings from the x-hex-message header. A mirror that answers one of those requests with an error whose body is a tar archive gets that archive written to standard output ahead of the verified tarball, so a pipeline that unpacks standard output extracts the mirror's files. This happens even when the checksum check then fails, because the archive is already on standard output. This issue affects hex: from 0.20.2 before 2.5.2.
References
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-105280.html
- https://github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/69489f8b74213f03db10169e6e5407e6d5fee512
- https://github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/8a14632ca6ba8a8afd2a3f2098bc267c13e13d93
- https://github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/d1f5a085d9d4748e1f7d195e4bc39ebd77c28d9c
- https://github.com/hexpm/hex/security/advisories/GHSA-98jr-23pm-vj7c
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-105280